# Pine Crest---Quarters

# 1NC

## 1NC—Johns Creek DX

### 1

#### Economic engagement must be quid-pro-quo

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy. The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power. The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged. The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 [To footnotes] 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

### 2

#### Silencing is active white privilege – upholds structures of whiteness

Carrie Crenshaw, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication, The University of Alabama, Summer 1997, “Resisting whiteness' rhetorical silence,” Western Journal of Communication 61.3, ebsco

Helms' silence about whiteness naturalized the taken-for-granted assumptions contained in his framework for understanding who is harmed by this decision. The "colossal unseen dimensions [of] the silences and denials surrounding" whiteness are key political tools for protecting white privilege and maintaining the myth of meritocracy (Mcintosh 35). This silence is rhetorical and has important ideological implications. Scott observes that silence and speaking have symbolic impact and as such are both rhetorical. When considering the dialectic of speaking and silence, he thinks of silence as the absence of speech. Silence is active, not passive; it may be interpreted. Furthermore, silence and speech may be both simultaneous and sequential. The absence of speech about whiteness signifies that it exists in our discursive silences. It may often be intentional; it can be interpreted, and it can occur simultaneously with the spoken word. Whiteness' silence is ideological because it signifies that to be white is the natural condition, the assumed norm. Scott notes that silences symbolize the nature of things--their substance or natural condition. Silences symbolize "hierarchical structures as surely as does speech" (15). Indeed, the very structure of privilege generates silences, and "ironically, the most powerful rhetoric for maintaining an existing scheme of privilege will be silent" (10). Thus, silent rhetorical constructions of whiteness like Helms' protect material white privilege because they mask its existence.

#### Opposing racism is the precondition to moral coherence.

Albert **Memmi, 2000**, Racism, p. 159-161

Evidently, I am a moderate optimist. The struggle against racism will be long and probably never totally successful. Humans [Vhomme] being what they are, one cannot for the moment hope for a total end to racist behavior. Even mixed marriage is not a remedy; the example of Brazil is hardly encouraging. There, rather than disappear, racism has created a more complex color hierarchy. In the Caribbean, social classes correspond to a scale of colors. It is as if racism can always find, in each case, the tactic or machination that will work.21 / But yet, humans being what they are, the job can and should be undertaken. People are both angels and beasts; the angel must be assisted in prevailing over the beast. Or, more prosaically, reciprocal dependence must be strengthened as the foundation of the social bond. Whatever the importance of a conflict between individuals or groups, the relative stability of social structures confirms a reciprocal need to engender an inclusive common law of life. Racism represents precisely the invecrse process, since it is a temptation to exclude and the legitimation of exclusion. / The pessimist will object that this is pure rhetoric designed to repackage the same old conduct. But even rhetorical effort is not wasted. Beyond its perversity, the racist discourse is a defense mechanism [plaidoyer] and an alibi. But every search for an alibi also contains within it an implicit recognition of the law. Racism is a structure of aggression that claims, and is given, a presupposed rationality. This pretense is the sign of its cunning and its false assertion of its own humanity. That is why no one wishes to own up to being racist; no one wishes to consent, in their heart, to renounce all humanity. The most hardened racists at least have one ear that hears, a port directly connected to that part of themselves that does not totally approve of iniquity and oppression. The mania and the horror of Nazism comes from what it had renounced of all legitimization, that it had made racism a philosophy if not a total conception of humanity. / Is that all there is? The infinite task before us can be discouraging in that it must always be begun again. Up to now, all peace has only been a truce between two wars, yet still we hope and long for peace. Health is fragile, and death is always in the offing, yet still we struggle to keep ourselves in good health. The struggle against racism is the condition of our collective social health. It encompasses the fundamental moral discussions of love or hate of the other, of justice or injustice, equality or oppression, or, in a word, one's very humanity. The essence of morality is respect for the other. Our honor as humans will be to construct a more human world. In the meanwhile, so that even animals may some day find a world of peace and security, let us act so that no one is any longer treated like a beast.

### 3

#### US-Brazil Relations are high now.

John Kerry, 8-13-2013, Secretary of State of the United States, “Remarks With Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota After Their Meeting,” <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213105.htm>

Now, obviously we have also had some moments of disagreement, and I’m sure I’ll have an occasion in the questions to be able to address some of that with you. But the United States and Brazil – I want to emphasize, rather than focus on an area of disagreement – the United States and Brazil share a remarkable and dynamic partnership. Every single day we work together to advance economic opportunity, human rights, environment protection, regional peace and security, democracy, as well as major global challenges in the Middle East and elsewhere – Syria for instance and the question of the humanitarian challenge in Syria. The United States respects and appreciates that Brazil is one of the world’s largest free market democracies, and our partnership is only made stronger as all of the world continues to grow. The United States recognizes and welcomes and greatly appreciates the vital leadership role, the increasing leadership role, that Brazil plays on the international stage – excuse me – and that ranges from its participation in global peace initiatives to its stability operations and promotion of human rights and its efforts to try to help either promote the peace or keep the peace in certain parts of the world. Through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we are working with Brazil and the United Nations to build the capacity of countries to be able to contribute themselves to peacekeeping operations. Brazil has provided more than 1,400 uniformed personnel to the stabilization mission in Haiti. We’re very grateful for that. And we’re also exploring opportunities for closer collaboration on peacekeeping in Africa. It’s fair to say that protecting universal rights is at the very heart of the shared values between Brazil and the United States. And together, we remain committed to advancing those rights and to advancing the cause of equality for all people. The United States also supports a very vibrant and active Organization of American States, and the OAS Charter reminds us of our responsibilities to offer our citizens liberty and to create the conditions in which all people can reach their aspirations, can live their aspirations. We believe that it is important that Brazil engage fully with the OAS and use its strong voice for a hemispheric vision of democracy and fundamental freedoms. Now, our relationship is not only rooted in shared values, it is literally strengthened every single day by our citizens. Each year thousands of people travel between the United States and Brazil, forging new ties between our countries. Student exchanges under President Rousseff’s Scientific Mobility Program, which I had the privilege of visiting this morning and sensing firsthand the amazing energy and excitement and commitment of these young people, that’s something we share in common. And together with President Rousseff’s program and President Obama’s 100,000 Strong in the Americas Initiative, we are encouraging together approaches to address the shared concerns of our young people to include social inclusion and to work towards things like environmental sustainability.

#### Unilateral interference in Latin America greatly upsets Brazil – collapses relations.

David Rothkopf, 3-xx-2009, President and CEO of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm specializing in transformational global trends, notably those associated with energy, security, and emerging markets, “The Perils of Rivalry,” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf>

There are other areas in which tension could enter the relationship. How the United States interacts with the Americas writ large under President Obama will shape relations and create potential pitfalls, and so will domestic political considerations both in the United States and Brazil. Any real or perceived interference in the region by the United States would greatly upset Brazil. If the United States decided that heavy-handed political pressure or intervention were required in regard, for example, to Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador, this could put Brazil in an uncomfortable position where it has to choose between the United States and its neighbors. Since Brazil has spent years arguing for South American unity, it would likely choose its neighbors or—even more likely—choose to interject itself as a third party with a third point of view.

#### US-Brazil relationship is key to successful Asia pivot.

Zachary Keck, 5-03-2012, deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat, “With Eye on Asia, U.S. Seeks Greater Global Security Role for Brazil,” <http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10961%3Awith-eye-on-asia-us-seeks-greater-global-security-role-for-brazil&Itemid=149>

With Eye on Asia, U.S. Seeks Greater Global Security Role for Brazil Last week’s inaugural U.S.-Brazilian Defense Cooperation Dialogue was the latest example of the Obama administration’s efforts to enhance defense cooperation with Brazil. Though improving broader relations with Brazil has been a priority for the Obama administration, the U.S. emphasis on bilateral defense ties should also be seen as part of Washington’s ongoing effort to get Brazil to increase its global security profile as the U.S. focuses more of its strategic attention and shrinking defense resources on the Western Pacific. Even before announcing the U.S. pivot to Asia last fall, the Obama administration had actively pursued expanded security ties with Brazil. The two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement in April 2010 and another agreement the following November to facilitate information-sharing. Both agreements have already resulted in greater military-to-military cooperation, at times in new domains. Although the U.S.-Brazilian navies have a long history of cooperation, most recently jointly participating in a maritime security exercise near Africa in February, cooperation between their air forces is a relatively new phenomenon. In 2010, the U.S. Air Force participated in Brazil’s annual Cruzex multinational air exercise for the first time. Next year, Brazil will reciprocate by joining the annual multilateral Red Flag exercise in Nevada. Since the Asia pivot, however, the Obama administration’s efforts have taken on a greater urgency. The White House dispatched Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey to Brasilia last March to further expand military-to-military ties. It has also been urging Congress to loosen restrictions on technology transfers to Brazil. The bilateral Defense Cooperation Dialogue was subsequently publicly unveiled during Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s trip to Washington last month. The first meeting of the new initiative took place April 24, during the Brazilian leg of U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s weeklong trip to Latin America. During his two-day visit, Panetta repeatedly called on Brazil to increase its role in global security. Washington’s interest in such an expanded Brazilian role stems from its need to increase its force posture in Asia while reducing overall defense spending. Brazil can help facilitate this shift in two ways. First, the U.S. will need to increase its arms sales if it hopes to maintain its defense industrial base in the face of its own budgetary constraints. Brazil’s robust economic growth and responsible global track record make it an attractive defense customer from Washington’s perspective. Brazil’s GDP in current dollars grew from $558 billion in 2000 to $1.78 trillion in 2010, a roughly 220 percent increase over the decade. Brazil is also wealthy relative to other large rising powers. As the world’s fifth-most-populous country, its GDP per capita is nearly equal to China and India’s combined. Brazil is already looking to purchase 36 multirole combat aircraft at a cost of $4 billion to $7 billion. The U.S.-based Boeing Corporation’s F/A-18 Super Hornet is competing with the French Rafale and Swedish Gripen for the contract. With Brazil’s decision expected in the coming weeks, Panetta wasn’t bashful in pushing for the Super Hornet during his trip, stating, “With the Super Hornet, Brazil's defense and aviation industries would be able to transform their partnerships with U.S. companies and . . . plug into worldwide markets." Second, by expanding its participation in international security operations, Brazil can help free up U.S. forces for the Western Pacific. The most obvious roles for the Brazilian military are in hemispheric security and patrolling the Atlantic Ocean. The latter is especially crucial as Washington stations more of its shrinking fleet in the Pacific. Interestingly, last week Panetta also said the U.S. wants Brazil to play a larger role in training African security forces. While the defense secretary justified this on the basis of Brazil’s historical ties to Africa -- Brazil was the largest destination of the Atlantic Slave Trade -- the main driver of U.S. policy is its pivot to Asia. Since the attacks of Sept. 11, U.S. Marines have taken the lead in training African partner nations for counterterrorism operations. With the U.S. looking to station more of its Marines in Asia, even as terrorist groups flourish in Africa, Washington needs others to perform this role. Once again, the Obama administration sees Brazil as a viable candidate.

#### Successful Asia pivot solves China war.

Friedberg 11 Princeton IA professor, 9-4-11, (Aaron L., “China’s Challenge at Sea,” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/opinion/chinas-challenge-at-sea.html?\_r=1, accessed 9-30-11)

If the United States and its Asian friends look to their own defenses and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason they cannot maintain a favorable balance of power, even as China’s strength grows. But if they fail to respond to China’s buildup, there is a danger that Beijing could miscalculate, throw its weight around and increase the risk of confrontation and even armed conflict. Indeed, China’s recent behavior in disputes over resources and maritime boundaries with Japan and the smaller states that ring the South China Sea suggest that this already may be starting to happen. Many of China’s neighbors are more willing than they were in the past to ignore Beijing’s complaints, increase their own defense spending and work more closely with one another and the United States. They are unlikely, however, to do those things unless they are convinced that America remains committed. Washington does not have to shoulder the entire burden of preserving the Asian power balance, but it must lead.

#### Otherwise, it goes nuclear.

Glaser 11 GW University Political Science Professor, 11 (Charles, HARLES GLASER is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University., "Will China's Rise Lead to War? ", Foreign Affairs, Mar/April 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2, factiva, accessed 11-9-11, )

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China-whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### 4

#### [CP TEXT: The United States federal government ought to offer to economically engage in a short-sea shipping strategy with Mexico for the purpose of trade if, and only if, the government of Mexico instates re-election procedures within the Mexican federal government, establishes and enforces term limits, strengthens the independent electoral system, standardizes electoral practices at state and local levels, and implement an improved law enforcement system to prevent electoral, police and judicial fraud and coercion.]

#### Conditioning economic ties on election and law reform solves the case and eliminates political corruption in Mexico.

Alex Velez-Green et al, 10-19-2012, writer for the Harvard Political Review, author for the Harvard Institute of Politics National Security Student Policy Group, Robin Reyes, graduated from the University of Alabama with a degree in International Business and International Studies, organized the 2011 Emprende tu México summit on creating a climate for investment and entrepreneurship in Mexico, Master’s in the field of Government from Harvard University, studied at Harvard Business School and the Kennedy School of Government, Anthony Ramicone, Institute of Politics @ Harvard University, “Governmental, Judicial and Police Corruption,” <http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf>

One way to reduce political corruption is to instate reelection procedures within the Mexican federal government. Within the current system, politicians are unable to seek a second term in office, and thus make decisions without fear of electoral repercussions. By giving politicians a chance at reelection, these procedures would make politicians more responsive to voters since voters can punish politicians whom they deem corrupt. Given Mexico’s history under the dictator Porfirio Diaz, it would be difficult to convince the Mexican public to support this kind of measure.30 Therefore, for this system to be effective, term limits would have to be established and enforced. Furthermore, Mexico would have to strengthen the independent electoral system (IFE), standardize electoral practices at state and local levels, and implement other mechanisms—including an improved law enforcement system—to prevent electoral fraud and coercion. Altering the mechanisms of funding between the Mexican federal and state governments would decrease corruption as well. Recently, the federal government has begun to provide performance-based funding; money is allocated to states for a specific purpose, and future funding depends on whether states have met said goals. The federal government should attempt to expand this policy. It should prepare counter-drug policies—such as restructuring municipal police forces—as goals for the state; as these goals are met, more money would be allocated to sustain these efforts and accommodate state-chosen projects. The federal government should make it clear that if the goals are met, then, more funding will be provided to states for uses of their choosing as long as they are transparent with the use of these funds. The above-mentioned proposals center upon steps to be taken by the Mexican government. To encourage these changes within Mexico, the United States should use American financial assistance, such as the Merida Initiative, as leverage over the Mexican legislature. Specifically, the U.S. should attach conditions mandating progress towards the above goals with assistance payments. To influence state and local policies in a more direct way, the U.S. should apply targeted funding on a much more individualized and localized basis. It can target funding, stipulating that as certain programs or policies are implemented by municipalities, such as restructuring the local police system, they would receive additional funding. These policies and programs should require independent oversight. This type of direct pressure at a local level should be done, as it will require much less bureaucracy and will produce more direct results.

#### Election reform is key to solve corruption – inaction collapses Mexican democracy.

NYT, 6-24-2009, the New York Times, American daily newspaper, has won 112 Pulitzer Prizes, more than any other news organization, “Crime Threatens Democracy, Mexico’s President Warns,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/world/americas/25mexico.html>

President Felipe Calderón said Wednesday that the future of democracy in Mexico was at stake in the government’s fight against official corruption and organized crime. He also criticized politicians whom he accused of wanting to return to the era when drug gangs were tolerated. Mr. Calderón also called for making legislators more accountable to the public. He proposed reducing the number of federal lawmakers and allowing them to serve more than one term, making them eligible to face the judgment of voters by running for re-election. Speaking at a conference on security, the president gave a scathing appraisal about how far corruption had reached into the Mexican government. “What is at stake today is not just the result of an election, but rather the future of democracy, of representative institutions,” he said. For many years, Mr. Calderón said, “crime was allowed to grow, expand and penetrate.” “Perhaps people thought it was a manageable thing,” he added. Mr. Calderón said that Mexico, where more than 10,800 people have died in violence connected with the illicit drug trade and other forms of organized crime since he took office in December 2006, “is at a historical crossroads.” “To turn one’s head, to act as if you don’t see the crime in front of you, as some politicians want to do, is no option for Mexico,” he said. Midterm elections are scheduled to be held on July 5. Mr. Calderón painted a grim picture of the security situation in some of the most violent parts of the country, noting that crime gangs and drug cartels were carrying out “an interminable recruitment of young people without hope, family, opportunities, future, beliefs or convictions.” He added, “They turn up dead in some morgue, and nobody claims their bodies, as happens with more than 30 percent of the bodies in the most violent cities, like Ciudad Juárez,” across the border from El Paso. In Ciudad Juárez on Wednesday, unidentified assailants tossed gasoline bombs into a billiard hall and a money exchange office. More than 30 businesses were burned in the city last year; threats of arson in Ciudad Juárez are often made by extortionists linked to drug gangs. Mr. Calderón repeated calls he made earlier in his political career as a member of Mexico’s Congress for reducing the number of federal legislators. There are now 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 128 in the Senate. He did not propose specific numbers, but he contended that having fewer lawmakers would make it easier to hold them accountable for the quality of their work. He also said that permitting legislators run for re-election would make them more accountable to their constituents. In the current system, elected officials from the president to federal lawmakers to town officials can serve in a specific post for only a single term, which is generally three or six years. As Mr. Calderón warned about corruption, the authorities in the northern city of Monterrey said Wednesday that soldiers who raided a modest illicit drug lab had found a list suggesting possible links between the police and organized crime.

#### Mexican democracy collapse kills global democracy – effective transition causes modeling.

Shannon K. O’Neal, 4-29-2013, a senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, “Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead,” <http://mexidata.info/id3609.html>

Diplomatically, we also need to rethink the United States' approach in light of Mexico's ongoing political transformation. A stronger partnership provides the best platform for a prominent U.S. twenty-first century foreign policy priority: democracy promotion. Despite frequent misunderstand¬ings our long shared history, intertwined economies, and strong personal and community links provide the constant multilayered interaction necessary to work together toward the complex goal of strengthening democracy. Joint economic development initiatives, support for local citizen organiza¬tions, and efforts to increase transparency and strengthen courts and police forces will all benefit from the strong links that already exist between our two nations. Mexico, not the Middle East, should be the test case for solidifying market-based democracy. It is not only much more likely to succeed, but also arguably much more likely to hurt the United States if it fails. Mexico's success is more probable because it has already taken many tough steps, all on its own. After seventy years of one-party rule, Mexicans used their votes to usher in an opposition party president. Abandoning a long history of ballot-box stuffing, Mexico's parties now compete in quite clean and trans-parent elections. The country's over 100 million citizens dream of—and are already working hard to create—a vibrant and prosperous political system where their voices can be heard and their hard work rewarded. If successful, Mexico would provide a positive example of a newly consolidated democracy, offering lessons for others worldwide. Nevertheless, it still faces considerable challenges. Many in fact worry that Mexico’s democratic gains may be lost, overcome by political bosses, special interests, and drug-related violence. And Mexico’s failure would lead to disastrous consequences for U.S. foreign policy, not to mention America’s economic, political, and social well-being at home. The United States’ focus elsewhere—particularly in Asia and the Middle East—has distracted us from the game-changing importance of political choices being made just next door.

#### Democracy solves extinction.

Larry Diamond, 1995, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### 5

#### [CP TEXT: The United States federal government should modernize its ground border transportation infrastructure with Mexico and economically engage Mexico for the purpose of trade.]

#### That solves.

Figueroa, Lee, and Schoik ’11 [December 12, 2011. Alejandro Figueroa is a Research and Policy Analyst at North American Center for Transborder Studies. Erik Lee is the Associate Director of NACTS. Rick Van Schoik is the Director of NACTS. “Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico” North American Center for Transborder Studies. <http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossborder-trade-with-mexico2.pdf>]

Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking a dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. Advances in border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA binational commercial relationship. Our border’s infrastructure and capacity today reflects the needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California port of entry —the busiest land port of entry in the world—had to shut down its 24 northbound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof, injuring several people and damaging vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments, inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive.

### 6

#### SSS requires dredging

Joseph Darcy, June-xx-2009, “Short Sea Shipping: Barriers, Incentives and Feasibility of Truck Ferry”

Congressman Cummings has introduced a bill in Congress to amend the Harbor Mainte nance Tax law [43]. This shows promise, however, as noted previously, measures like this have been on the Congressional calendar for the past 6-7 years with no result. Former Secretary of Transportation, Mary Peters stated that the ‘Harbor Maintenance Tax is the most significant impediment under current law to the initiation of [SSS] [17].” 4.4.2 Dredging Many organizations believe that the condition of U.S. ports and waterways is reaching a crisis [19]. Low water levels in frhe Great Lakes and poor dredging hurts the shippers. Ships hauling ore on the lakes must leave port with an average of 6400 long tons of capacity unfilled due to reduced drafts in the ports they serve [31].

#### Dredging adversely effects aquatic habitats – destroys marine biodiversity and independently kills the fishing industry – their defense doesn’t apply

**Phernambucq**, 19**93** – District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer (Stanley G, “DREDGING: KEY LINK IN THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL DEFENSE”, 15 April 1993, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA264544>) // CB

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF DREDGING There are environmental resources that may be at risk during dredging activities. Dredging is not a benign activity; it disrupts habitats and redistributes sediments. These activities can significantly effect the coastal ecosystem and destroy marine life, especially sedentary invertebrates. These invertebrates are important parts of the food chain and contribute to the feeding of other fish; fish which are ultimately used for human consumption. Other aquatic impacts of dredging include habitat loss when the sea bottom is altered. This occurs when dredged materials are deposited at a location and its material composition is altered. This decreases the diversity and abundance of certain species. Water circulation can be impacted when mounding occurs. This action can cause different siltation deposits and lead to the elimination of spawning areas. Turbidity, or the suspension of sediments into the water column, can result in reduced light penetration and expose fish to abrasive materials. Most importantly, dredging has the potential of releasing comparatively large doses of toxic substances into a new aquatic environment and to make them available to marine organisms. These materials include heavy metals, PCB's, pesticides, and other toxic materials that are certain to persist in marine life for quite some time. Many species of marine life are sensitive to the impacts of dredging. The testing procedures previously described are designed to preclude the release of materials that could pose an unacceptable risk to marine life. The real dilemma arises as to how much is acceptable to the environment.2

#### Loss of marine biodiversity causes extinction – US is key

**Craig**, 20**03**, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana U School Law, McGeorge Law Review, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155 Lexis

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity.  [\*265]   Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us.

### Auto Industry

#### Short sea shipping fails

**Koch**, 20**11**, President & CEO of the World Shipping Council (Christopher, “Statement of Christopher Koch President & CEO World Shipping Council before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee on the Economic importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?”, October 26, 2011,  [<http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Koch.pdf>)//MM](http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Darcy.pdf)//MM)

“Short sea shipping" for the carriage of intermodal cargo is today, and will likely remain for the foreseeable future, a very market specific enterprise, with obvious and significant geographic limitations. Surface transportation usually offers faster, more frequent, and often less expensive service to shippers. Further, short sea shipping does not often avoid the need for a shipper to arrange for surface transportation service on both ends of the maritime movement; thus, a shipper that needs to arrange a combined truck/short sea shipping/truck move to get its goods from Point A to Point B may find it simpler to arrange for a single truck move.

#### Readiness doesn’t solve war – empirics

Christopher Fettweis, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, 2010, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy” pg 59-82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### No impact – 93 empirical examples

Miller 2K

(Morris Miller, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter 2000, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would **not appear to be** any **merit in this** hypothesis. After studying *ninety-three episodes* of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of **economic crisis** - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore *no relationship* to the *collapse of regimes* ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an *outbreak of violence* ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

### Shipbuilding

#### No impact to naval power

Goure 10 (Daniel, Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD, “Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, Hemanth)

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses. More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### US naval power is bad – causes Chinese naval nationalism in response to perceived containment strategies

Kaplan, ‘10

(Robert, national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “The Geog­ra­phy of Chi­nese Power,” Foreign Affairs, NJ)

GETTING SEA LEGS / Thanks to this favorable situation on land, China is now free to work at building a great Navy. Whereas coastal city-states and island nations pursue sea power as a matter of course, doing so is a luxury for historically insular continental powers such as China. In China's case, this might be a luxury that is fairly easy to acquire since the country is as blessed by its seaboard as by its continental interior. China dominates the East Asian coastline in the temperate and tropical zones of the Pacific, and its southern border is close enough to the Indian Ocean that it might one day be linked to it by roads and energy pipelines. In the twenty-first century, China will project hard power abroad primarily through its Navy. / That said, it faces a far more hostile environment at sea than it does on land. The Chinese Navy sees little but trouble in what it calls the "first island chain": the Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Japan (including the Ryukyu Islands), Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. All except for Australia are potential flashpoints. China is already embroiled in various disputes over parts of the energy-rich ocean beds of the East China Sea and the South China Sea: with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. Such disputes allow Beijing to stoke nationalism at home, but for Chinese naval strategists, this seascape is mostly grim. This first island chain is, in the words James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College, a kind of "Great Wall in reverse": a well-organized line of U.S. allies that serve as a sort of guard tower to monitor and possibly block China's access to the Pacific Ocean. / China's answer to feeling so boxed in has been aggressive at times. Naval power is usually more benign than land power: navies cannot by themselves occupy vast areas and must do far more than fight -- namely, protect commerce. Thus, one might have expected China to be as benevolent as other maritime nations before it -- Venice, Great Britain, the United States -- and to concern itself primarily, as those powers did, with preserving a peaceful maritime system, including the free movement of trade. But China is not so self-confident. Still an insecure sea power, it thinks about the ocean territorially: the very terms "first island chain" and "second island chain" (the second island chain includes the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) suggest that the Chinese see all these islands as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese landmass. In thinking in such a zero-sum fashion about their country's adjoining seas, China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle. But they do not yet have the blue-water force to apply it, and this discrepancy between aspirations and means has led to some awkward incidents over the past few years. In October 2006, a Chinese submarine stalked the USS Kitty Hawk and then surfaced within a torpedo's firing range of it. In November 2007, the Chinese denied the USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group entry into Victoria Harbor when it was seeking a respite from building seas and deteriorating weather. (The Kitty Hawk did make a visit to Hong Kong in 2010.) In March 2009, a handful of PLA Navy ships harassed the U.S. surveillance ship the USNS Impeccable while it was openly conducting operations outside China's 12-mile territorial limit in the South China Sea, blocking its way and pretending to ram it. These are the actions not of a great power but of a still immature one.

#### That drives modernization, kills relations and causes war – only a loss of naval power solves

Ross, ‘09

(Robert S, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security, Vol 34, Number 2, Fall 09, Project Muse, NJ)

Nearly all Chinese security analysts concur that China’s security is increasingly dependent on vulnerable sea-lanes. More moderate “naval pragmatists” argue, however, that the cost for China of pursuing blue-water maritime power is excessive. They contend that the United States will be determined to maintain its maritime superiority, that China lacks the resources to compete in a great-power naval competition, and that an effort to build a blue-water, power-projection Navy will undermine Chinese security. Therefore, China should focus its limited resources on its submarine-based access-denial capability, while maintaining great power cooperation to secure its access to global resources. One senior academic described the aircraft carrier as a “black hole” for Chinese funds and argues that China could better use its resources to acquire additional submarines.[88](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f88) China’s authoritative military publications frequently remind their readers that land powers face considerable difficulty in developing maritime power and that interrupting and securing sea-lanes, as well as occupying small coral islands (e.g., the disputed Spratly Islands), are very difficult operations. They often advocate that China focus on more realistic objectives, including development of asymmetric maritime capabilities. Some military analysts tend to be dismissive of “amateurs” who advocate naval power.[89](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f89) / China’s naval pragmatists also stress the damage that a carrier program would inflict on Chinese diplomacy. They argue that whereas a carrier would have minimum benefit for Chinese security, it would undermine China’s peaceful rise strategy by accentuating the role of “hard power” in Chinese diplomacy. [End Page 72] After nearly thirty years of successful management of the “rise of China,” they are concerned that construction of a power-projection Navy would undermine both U.S.-China relations and China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries. Foreign ministry officials tend to oppose construction of an aircraft carrier, sensitive to the impact on Chinese diplomacy. But in the current nationalistic environment, they have minimal influence on defense policy. In addition, they recognize that they cannot offset the pressure from Chinese society.[90](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f90) Chinese nationalists dismiss the potential costs of a naval buildup. Rather than address the challenge of simultaneous development of land and maritime capabilities and of naval competition with the United States, naval nationalists assert that China should devote equal resources to both theaters. Some nationalists argue that because China faces challenges from both Russia and the United States and because it confronts many neighbors on both land and sea, it must simultaneously pursue land and naval capabilities and that failure to develop both land and sea power will constrain China’s great power role in world affairs.[91](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f91) One author argues that China’s strategic orientation toward both land and sea is a geopolitical advantage and that the development of large-scale ground and naval forces serves Chinese comprehensive power and is the optimal deployment of Chinese forces.[92](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f92) Another author acknowledges that the U.S. network of global naval bases is a strategic advantage for the U.S. Navy, but this simply requires that China build an aircraft carrier with greater displacement than U.S. carriers.[93](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f93) China’s challenge to the maritime status quo would likely elicit a U.S. response that not only would offset China’s buildup but also could contribute to costly U.S.-China tension. Nonetheless, following the onset of the global financial crisis and the U.S. recession in 2008, many Chinese nationalists believe that the United States is a declining power and that China has the opportunity to develop a powerful Navy.[94](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f94) Moreover, they argue that China has “no choice but to build a Navy centered on the aircraft carrier”; it cannot allow U.S. strategic advantages to inhibit Chinese naval planning. One author states, “If [End Page 73] this logic prevails, if there came a time when the United States occupies a strategic location on the Chinese mainland, should China then be compelled not to develop an army?”[95](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f95) Chinese scholars acknowledge that the determination of the United States to protect its maritime supremacy could lead it to inflict a “Copenhagen” on the PLA Navy.[96](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f96) Nonetheless, China “should not be afraid of drawing fire against itself so that China’s national security is completely constrained by external conditions and it is powerless.” If the “hegemon” so “dreads Chinese naval power that it would launch a preventive attack, this simply proves . . . that China must definitely develop a powerful maritime force.”[97](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f97) Ultimately, China’s naval buildup could lead to U.S.-China tension that could exceed tension over Taiwan, but China “has to do what it has to do.” It cannot “seek to please the United States. . . . Why should China build weapons that the United States does not care about?” Rather, it should build the very weapons that the United States “cares most about.”[98](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.binghamton.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.2.ross.html#f98)

#### Multiple alt causes to naval collapse –

#### Debt makes defense cuts inevitable

**Bencivenga, 10** [Jim Bencivenga is a former teacher and Monitor staffer, “Will US naval power sink?”http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1025/Will-US-naval-power-sink,

That's a mistake, because our commitment to naval power today will affect America's standing in the world – and its ability to contain an increasingly aggressive [China](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/China) – for the next half century. Yet this commitment is on shaky ground given the out-of-control national debt. And the ruling party has few hands on deck to meet this national challenge. One gauge of a [great power's military stature](http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0923/p04s01-usmi.html) is the readiness of its fleet versus that of its likely foes. Deterring an aggressive China According to a 2009 Pentagon report, China has an estimated 260 naval vessels, all concentrated in [East Asia](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/East+Asia). The [United States](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/United+States) has 288 battle-force ships with 11 carrier task forces and dozens of nuclear submarines as the crown jewels. The US fleet patrols worldwide. China's fleet has been concentrated in its home waters, but its range is rapidly extending to as far as the [Middle East](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Middle+East). "China seeks domination of the [South China Sea](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/South+China+Sea) to be the dominant power in much of the Eastern Hemisphere," defense expert [Robert D. Kaplan](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Robert+Kaplan) has written. As Mr. Kaplan notes, the South China Sea is a vital route for much of [Asia](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Asia)'s commercial traffic and energy needs. The US and other nations consider it an international passageway. China calls it a "core interest." To maintain naval strength, reduce debt To keep the US blue-water fleet the best in the world costs billions. A [debtor nation eventually cuts defense spending](http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0628/Cuts-to-US-defense-budget-look-inevitable), and big-ticket items like new ships are the first to go. That is why maritime defense is the sleeper issue of these elections. The party that reduces national debt can maintain naval strength. The party that doesn't allows US naval prominence to sink.

#### Asymmetry – Chinese ASBMs prove

Sollenberger, et al. ‘10 (Matthew Sollenberger, M.A. student at the Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, B.A. political science with high honors, Swarthmore College; Thilo Schroeter, M.A. student at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, B.A. International Relations, Dresden University of Technology; Bastiaan Verink, M.A. student at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, LL.M. International Security with honors, VU University Amsterdam, B.A. International Relations and Economics, Utrecht University; “Challenging US Command of the Commons: Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony?” Bologna Center Journal for International Affairs, vol. 13, Spring 2010, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-13/challenging-us-command-of-the-commons.html>)

Development of anti-access measures China is aware that, in order to be successful in a military confrontation over Taiwan, it must prevent the US from entering the conflict or at least degrade the size and effectiveness of a projected US military intervention.26 In view of the US military’s superiority, China has developed anti-access measures which have “the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer.”27 Chinese anti-access measures focus strongly on US air power. Command of the air has been one of the cornerstones of US military superiority in the post-cold war era, a fact that became most evident to China during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996.28 Parallel to its long-term effort to modernize its air force and other air defense capacities, China has invested significant resources to develop anti-access measures to prevent the deployment of US naval and land-based air power in a potential conflict with Taiwan.29 Conventional ballistic missiles China has sharply increased its capacity to attack US air bases in the region, particularly in Okinawa.30 China has been modernizing its fleet of fighter-bombers and arsenal of cruise missiles, but these systems continue to be vulnerable to more advanced US and Japanese fighter aircraft, supported by ground and air-based early warning systems. However, an attack by ballistic missiles can only be countered by anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.31 Although these systems offer a certain degree of protection against ballistic missile attacks, a completely successful defense against a surprise attack with ballistic missiles is highly unlikely.32 While ballistic missiles are not effective at destroying aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters, they can destroy large, high-value aircraft such as AWACS and tanker aircraft too large for normal shelters. Furthermore, ballistic missiles can destroy runways with sub- munitions and thus leave the paralyzed air bases vulnerable to follow-on attacks.33 China has been deploying the DF-21C, a conventionally armed medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), since 2004-2005.34 Using this missile, PLA forces could attack US airbases in Okinawa, South Korea, and mainland Japan. Currently, hardened aircraft shelters are available only at four US air bases in the region. The base closest to the Taiwan Strait, Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, has only 15 hardened aircraft shelters, leaving most of the 190 aircraft likely to be deployed in a crisis vulnerable to attacks.35 Unless additional hardened aircraft shelters are constructed, effective ABM systems are deployed, and damage control capacities are strengthened, the deployment of Chinese MRBMs will make dispersal and basing at a greater distance necessary to avoid the risk of a crippling strike against US land-based air power.36 Anti-ship ballistic missiles China is also strengthening its ability to attack US aircraft carriers at long distances using anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). Since the mid-90s, China has modernized its submarine force, deployed anti-ship cruise missiles on its ships, and introduced modern Russian fighter-bombers equipped with anti-ship missiles.37 However, all of these weapon systems are constrained by their limited range and limited ability to penetrate the protection afforded by the anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare capacities of US carrier strike groups.38 In contrast, ASBMs have the potential to destroy US carriers before they even enter the theater of operations around Taiwan – a potential “game-changer” in a military conflict.39 Based on a survey of Chinese technical and doctrinal publications, a number of US non-profit and government institutions claim that China has had significant success in its pursuit of an ASBM capacity. Although there has been no official acknowledgment by Chinese authorities, nor any known test of ASBM assets, an initial capacity is estimated to be available in 2010.40 The Chinese ASBM capacity is based on the existing DF-21 class of medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,500–2,000 km.41 The first anti-ship variant of this missile will likely have a comparable range, while future models may use “boost-glide trajectory” capabilities to allow ranges of 3,000–8,000 km by 2020.42 Targeting data for ASBM launches could be provided by over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems and different types of satellites. China already operates an OTH radar with a range of up to 3,000 km, allowing it to monitor ship movements in a wide arc between Japan and the Philippines.43 China is also developing satellites that can detect carriers using synthetic aperture radar (SAR) or by tracking their electronic emissions.44 Once an ASBM is launched against the approximate position of an aircraft carrier, an onboard SAR system would provide mid-course guidance from an altitude of around 80 km to the missile’s maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV).45 In order to specifically target and destroy key carrier infrastructure, including “carrier-borne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions,”46 terminal guidance to the conventional warheads would be provided by a combination of millimeter wave radar and infrared seekers.47 The consequences of this development are significant. ASBMs offer an unprecedented and relatively low cost surgical strike capability against aircraft carriers, to which there are only limited and risky countermeasures available. Because of the precision of ASBM warheads, it is not necessary to sink an aircraft carrier to achieve a “mission kill,” allowing China to strike at carriers while avoiding the risk of escalation that would most certainly incorporate the sinking of an aircraft carrier and the resulting deaths of up to 5,000 US sailors.48 Additionally, ASBM systems appear to be both effective and highly cost-efficient: assuming a relatively low success rate of 25%, only 4 ASBMs, costing between 40 and 80 million USD in total, would suffice to disable a US aircraft carrier. 49 Countermeasures to ASBMs are either limited in their effectiveness or bear risks of escalation. Direct defense is hard to achieve, given the extremely high speed of ASBMs and the ability to use mid-course maneuvers to change the trajectory. A further disadvantage for a ship defending against an ASBM attack is the limited number of ABM missiles carried onboard. So far, only 75 SM-3 ABMs, to be carried by 18 destroyers and cruisers, have been ordered for the US Navy.50 If a carrier is augmented with two ships carrying six SM-3 each, only 12 ASBMs could currently be defended against in a best-case scenario, as reloading at sea is not possible.51 While defense against ASBMs in flight is difficult, preemptive attacks against the launch platforms and C4ISR infrastructure are risky alternatives. To destroy the mobile launchers, which could be stationed throughout much of Eastern China, or the supporting radar systems, air strikes might be necessary against targets over 1,000 km inland. However, executing such attacks against the depth of the Chinese mainland would be a difficult and highly escalatory option. When Chinese ASBMs become effective to a range of 2,000 km, US carriers might have to operate at distances far from Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, such that carrier-based fighters such as the F/A-18 or the future Joint Strike Fighter could hardly enter the fight.52 Using ballistic missiles against US naval and land-based air power, China can substantially reduce the volume of air power available to the US to deter or repel Chinese military action against Taiwan. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges the threat posed inter alia by Chinese ballistic missiles and has suggested an increased reliance on submarine-based weapons, development of armed naval UAVs and new cruise missiles for long-range strikes, as well as strengthened active and passive defenses for overseas US air bases.53 However, until the US has fielded these and other effective countermeasures to the Chinese ballistic missile threat, China’s anti-access strategy may be successful in deterring US intervention in a military conflict over Taiwan.

#### Lack of bandwidth

Grace V. Jean, Journalist, ‘11 “Drone Sensor Data Will Overload Networks, Navy Officials Warn”, National Defense Magazine, NDIA Business and Technology Magazine, August,<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/August/Pages/DroneSensorDataWillOverloadNetworks,NavyOfficialsWarn.aspx>

The expected growth of unmanned systems at sea is raising concerns that the Navy’s networks are ill prepared to handle the commensurate flood of data that the sensors will produce. "The Navy’s architecture is not designed to address the influx of sensors that is coming on,” said Chris Miller, executive director of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic. The Navy’s maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roadmap indicates that officials intend to field a fleet of unmanned undersea vehicles by the end of the decade along with a squadron of unmanned carrier-launched aircraft by 2018. The fleet already is operating several robotic helicopters to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Somalia, and those systems are producing a lot of data, officials said at a recent naval IT conference in Vienna, Va. “Information is exploding and much of it is coming from the sea,” said David Weddel, assistant deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance. As the Navy fields unmanned systems, the demand for bandwidth and data is going to increase by more than 1,000 percent, he said. “In the past, we always received more information [at sea] than we ever had to push back,” he said. “That equation has changed.” The MQ-8 Fire Scout, a vertical take-off and landing unmanned aerial vehicle, or VTUAV, is producing a fair amount of data and that number is only going to increase as more systems hit the fleet, Weddel said. There are two VTUAVs operating from frigates sailing off the coast of Somalia conducting anti-piracy operations and supporting special operations forces ashore. One was reportedly shot down in June over Libya, where it had been diverted to support NATO forces. Three more Fire Scouts are supporting troops in Afghanistan. Weddel said the Navy has plans to develop a follow-on to those aircraft. The medium-range maritime unmanned air system will carry heavier payloads and have longer endurance, he added. Beneath the ocean, sailors are operating unmanned undersea vehicles called littoral battle space gliders that sense water temperature and salinity. The submersible robots are producing large amounts of data because they capture pictures of the ocean battle space, said Weddel. Three of them deployed last year to the Gulf of Mexico to support government officials during the BP oil spill crisis. They were employed to help track the location and depth of the oil. These semi-autonomous vehicles and drones — in conjunction with other manned naval systems such as the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft — are expected to carry sophisticated sensors and other equipment to quickly provide sailors with pertinent battle information. “We’re all in on sensors,” said Miller. “But what we haven’t done is balance out the equation and make sure I’ve got the bandwidth coming to my ships to make sure I can get that data off the ship,” he said. Industry will offer solutions to speed up data and processing on the network, he added. While that is helpful, “my argument is, we need a bigger systems of systems architecture and discussion about what we need to go do,” he said. And it is not only the drones and underwater robots driving up the demand for bandwidth and network capability. Ships themselves will too, officials said. The Navy’s newest class of surface combatants, the littoral combat ship, will become increasingly dependent on Defense Department networks for reach back capability to attain operational support and intelligence from shore-based systems. The ship was designed to operate with a small onboard crew of about 40 sailors and a support team ashore to take care of administrative duties, including maintenance and supply. As a result, communications from the ship back to shore is critical. “So here you have a platform that moves at high speeds from hotspot to hotspot,” said Rear Adm. Edward “Ned” Deets III, commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command. “How do you prepare the [commanding officer] and crew with the level of information and capability that they need for the next threat which, at the speed of operation of this ship, is in many cases simply three to four to five hours away?” The challenge this presents to the Navy is the capacity to move information— whether it’s satellite-based, line of sight-based, or within networks aboard ships — and to analyze the data. “An awful lot of data is going to fall on the cutting room floor if we can’t figure out how we can automate the data processing and data analysis,” said Weddel. There also needs to be a discussion about how much information is stored aboard a ship and how much of it can be posted to a site or uploaded to another repository where it is retrievable via Defense Department networks. “It could be the marines on the beach, or maybe the SOF we’re supporting in the Horn of Africa. It’s not just about the Navy,” Weddel said. Whatever network supports this must be able to form and reform very quickly, especially when it comes to data links between ships and the unmanned systems, he added. Data links are the “pipes” that systems use to communicate. Many data links are proprietary and limit the ability to share information among multiple sensors and networks. “There’s nothing common about common data links, and it’s killing me,” said Weddel. There are at least 11 different common data link programs and three additional ones for the Marine Corps, he pointed out. “It has to stop. I don’t have enough antennas onboard ship to do it, and it’s hurting our war fighting capability,” he said. The Navy is making plans to pursue a true common system beginning in 2013, he added. The other challenge to consider is the Navy’s reliance upon satellites

to transmit its communications globally. “Bandwidth for the time being is adequate. But what happens when the bandwidth becomes limited or adversaries start jamming satellites?” Weddel said. Potential enemies have realized how much the Defense Department depends upon space-based systems to conduct its business. The ability to jam satellites is available, he pointed out. “So the question becomes, ‘How does the Navy maintain connectivity within the battle group?’” he said. The department is conducting a study for a joint airborne layer network that could substitute for jammed satellite networks. Officials intend to budget for the system in 2014. Industry can help solve the Navy’s network challenge by automating some of the processes, designing common antennas and conforming to standard waveforms and capability. It can also address human factor issues, such as making the networked information easier for young sailors to manipulate and digest. Another challenge is information assurance — securing the information once it enters Navy networks. A large part of that is imbuing into the Navy culture the idea that IT networks are combat systems, and that they need to be treated as such, said Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert, who has been tapped to replace Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, who is retiring.

# 2NC

## Conditions CP

### 2NC CP – AT: Immediacy K/ – AT: Delay

#### Election reforms pass super quickly – streamlined legislative process, autonomous election commission, and the process is already happening.

Enrique J. Unanue, 8-19-2013, writer for the State-Journal Register, Springfield, “Letter: Good ideas from Mexico,” <http://www.sj-r.com/letters/x997498677/Letter-Good-ideas-from-Mexico>

I just read an article about legislative improvements made in Mexico that will streamline and make their legislative process more efficient and responsive to the needs of the citizenry. Two of these have already been enacted by statute and one is in the process of being enacted. First, they have appointed an independent and autonomous election commission to govern how elections are run in the country, thus ensuring impartiality and fairness in the electoral process. Should we enact a similar law? Maybe then we can eliminate the lobbying power of special interests and ensure that the will of the people is heard over that of those of wealth and privilege. Second, they have eliminated the long-held immunity clause protecting those elected to public office from prosecution for crimes and malfeisance committed during their terms in office. This can insure an equal footing among all. Elected officials should be held accountable to the same laws they enact for the rest of us. Third, they are in the process of legislating term limits to limit the tenure of elected officials to one consecutive term. This will ensure that elected officials may not hold office for long periods of time, thus inviting inordinate control of legislative bodies and dictatorial behaviours on their part.

### 2NC CP – AT: Say No – Top Level

#### Broad Mexican support for electoral reforms now – they’ll agree in a heartbeat.

Gunther Hamm, 12-17-2006, writer for Reuters and the Washington Post, “Mexico could drop revolutionary ban on reelection,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/17/AR2006121700493.html

While many nations bar presidential re-election, Mexico also bans consecutive terms for legislators, which is rare and, some say, outdated. It now faces growing calls for change. "Many who come to Congress for the first time have no idea what Congress is, so every three years we have to start from scratch," said Congresswoman Dora Alicia Martinez, who will present a reform bill during the current legislative session. Reformers say spectacles like a punch-up in Congress before President Felipe Calderon's December 1 inauguration would not happen if lawmakers had more experience and knew they would face voters again. Advocates for change say allowing deputies and senators to seek re-election would force them to be more accountable to their constituents and make Congress more effective. No one proposes presidents be given the right to run again. The popular revolutionary slogan, twinning calls for fair elections with a ban on multiple terms, was raised in 1910 against the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz and around a million people were killed in the ensuing violence as Diaz was ousted and rival factions battled for power across Mexico. It still graces government stationary, and in a slightly altered form was the rallying cry for hundreds of thousands of leftist protesters this year who claimed Calderon won July elections unfairly. Civic Alliance, a non-partisan group that campaigns for electoral reform, says the legislative re-election proposal could win the two-thirds majority of the lower house and Senate needed for approval. "I don't know of anyone in Congress who is openly against this," said Silvia Alonso, the group's director. Calderon's conservative National Action Party, or PAN, has long supported re-election and he would almost certainly sign it into law if it passes through Congress.

### 2NC CP – AT: P/ CP – Top Level

#### “Resolved” necessitates certainty.

American Heritage Dictionary, 11-xx-2011, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, an American dictionary of the English language published by Boston publisher Houghton Mifflin, “resolve,” <http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=resolved&submit.x=-826&submit.y=-210>

re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves v.tr. 1. a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide.

#### “Should” mandates certainty.

The Collins English Dictionary, 12-31-2011, the Collins English Dictionary, a printed and online dictionary of English, “English Dictionary – definition of “should”,” <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/should?showCookiePolicy=true>

should Definitions verb the past tense of shall: used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory ( you should go) or to form the subjunctive mood with I or we ( I should like to see you; if I should be late, go without me) See also shall Should has, as its most common meaning in modern English, the sense ought as in I should go to the graduation, but I don't see how I can. However, the older sense of the subjunctive of shall is often used with I or we to indicate a more polite form than would: I should like to go, but I can't. In much speech and writing, should has been replaced by would in contexts of this kind, but it remains in formal English when a conditional subjunctive is used: should he choose to remain, he would be granted asylum Word Origin Old English sceold; see shall shall Definitions verb Word forms: past tense should takes an infinitive without to or an implied infinitive esp with I or we as subject used as an auxiliary to make the future tense ⇒ we shall see you tomorrow Compare will1 (sense 1) with you, he, she, it, they, or a noun as subject used as an auxiliary to indicate determination on the part of the speaker, as in issuing a threat ⇒ you shall pay for this! used as an auxiliary to indicate compulsion, now esp in official documents ⇒ the Tenant shall return the keys to the Landlord used as an auxiliary to indicate certainty or inevitability ⇒ our day shall come

#### “Should” requires immediacy.

Summers, 94 — Justice on the Oklahoma Supreme Court (“Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 199hgghj4 OK 123, 11-8, <http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13>)

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)  5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### “Substantial” means unconditional and immediate.

Words and Phrases, 1964 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### “Increase” must be immediate relative to the status quo.

Rogers 5 Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis

[\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

#### “Toward” implies certainty.

Anne Marie Lofaso, 2-24-2010, West Virginia University, College of Law, “Talking is Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558563>

The obligations placed on employers are significant in two ways. First and significantly, the Collective Redundancies Directive places on employers a duty to consult "with a view to reaching an agreement." n172 Given the Directive's language choice, this consultation right seems to be at least coextensive with the federal right to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act and perhaps even greater than the right granted under the NLRA. Federal courts interpreting NLRA Section 8(d)'s definition of the bargaining duty n173 have made clear that the duty to bargain does not include the duty to come to agreement. n174 Perhaps this is why Professor [\*86] Summers, in describing the duty to bargain under Section 8(d) always referred to it as obligating the parties to bargain in good faith with "a view toward reaching agreement." The use of the preposition "toward" suggests a duty to come close to agreement but not a duty to close the deal.

## Land Border TI CP

### 2NC CP—AT: Auto Industry Says No

#### Auto industry uses transport-by-land now.

CDoT 06 (San Diego Association of Governments California Department of Transportation, “Economic Impacts of ¶ Wait Times at the San ¶ Diego–Baja California ¶ Border” <http://www.sandag.org/uploads/publicationid/publicationid\_1205\_5394.pdf> 1-19-06)

The magnitude of the impact will depend on the group of commodities under consideration. In ¶ some cases, a one-hour delay at the border means that the shipment will not be delivered until the ¶ next day. This may have major consequences to industries that are time sensitive. Examples of ¶ highly time sensitive industries include those industries in which just-in-time inventory ¶ 19 The price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price, with all ¶ other factors held constant. For instance, a price elasticity of demand of – 0.5 means that a 1 percent increase in ¶ price will lead to a 0.5% decrease in quantity demanded. HDR|HLB DECISION ECONOMICS INC. PAGE • 29¶ management is widespread (e.g., automotive industry),20 or in which perishability is a key factor ¶ (e.g., agricultural products).

#### Auto industry prefers land transport—just-in-time delivery

AP 12 (Associated Press, “Crises make automakers rethink their reliance on just-in-time parts delivery” <http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/04/crises\_make\_automakers\_rethink.html> 4-21-12)

DETROIT (AP) — For the first time in more than 20 years, U.S. automakers are questioning a pillar of manufacturing: The practice of bringing parts to assembly lines right before they’re used.¶ So-called just-in-time deliveries have helped automakers save billions and run their factories more efficiently. But the approach also relies on an almost perfect supply chain. And twice in the last year, weak links have been exposed.¶ An earthquake in March 2011 knocked out many Japanese parts makers, resulting in factory shutdowns and model shortages around the world. And last month, an explosion at a German chemical plant cut off supplies of a resin essential in car fuel lines. Without those parts, assembly lines could slow or grind to a halt within weeks, causing shortages of cars on dealer lots later this year.¶ Carmakers are scrambling to find alternatives to the resin. The threat of a new shortage comes as U.S. auto sales are just becoming healthy again.¶ Supply problems in the auto industry are unavoidable sometimes, but car manufacturers are starting to rethink the just-in-time system, which is more global than ever and relies on increasingly specialized parts from fewer suppliers.¶ The system, developed by Toyota in the 1970s and brought to the U.S. in the 1980s, discourages big stockpiles of parts in favor of deliveries shortly before they’re needed. It saves companies the cost of storing the parts or carrying them on their books. For those reasons, automakers and large suppliers typically store only a few weeks’ worth of parts.¶ “It’s pretty fragile,” says Steven Wybo, a managing director and automotive expert at Conway Mackenzie, a consulting firm that handles industry restructurings. “The only way to protect supply is to build up inventory. Until that happens, we’re going to continue to see problems like this.”¶ U.S. automakers say they are studying parts supplies to figure out what they need to stockpile. Many of a car’s 3,000 parts have become so specialized that they’re made only by a few factories worldwide. That leaves the industry vulnerable to fires, natural disasters or other problems that may knock out a single parts factory.¶ How ’just-in-time’ parts supply works¶ The auto industry’s switch to a just-in-time delivery system saves money, but has left it vulnerable when parts supplies are interrupted by natural disasters, fires or other incidents. Here’s a quick look at the system.¶ HOW IT WORKS: Automakers and parts companies schedule deliveries to assembly plants so parts arrive shortly before they are needed in cars and trucks. The system was pioneered by Toyota and copied by U.S.-based companies.¶ ADVANTAGES: Big stockpiles of parts cost a lot of money, and automakers can avoid the expense.¶ DISADVANTAGES: If parts plants are disabled by a natural disaster or fire, companies have few supplies on hand. Even a small part can stop automakers from producing cars and trucks. That can disrupt supplies to dealers and send customers elsewhere.¶ The answer may be to stock up on parts that come from one factory, says David Cole, chairman emeritus of the Center for Automotive Research, an industry think tank and research group. “You can never take away risk completely,” he says. “You want to minimize it.”

## Auto Industry Advantage

### 2NC—Economy Defense

#### Zero conflicts happening today over multiple databases can be attributed to economic downturn.

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’09

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's **first** truly **worldwide recession** has had virtually ***no impact whatsoever*** on the international security landscape. *None* of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a **most familiar picture**: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a **process *wholly unrelated to global economic trends****.* And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

# 1NR

## Shipbuilding Advantage

### 2NC Navy Bad Impact Kata

#### And, Crisis rationale ensures nuclear escalation

Wilson, 6

(Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, “Rationale for a study of City Annihilations,” http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city\_annihilation/, NJ [GENDERED LANGUAGE IS BAD AND WE WON’T DEFEND IT])

The rationality/risk argument is more likely to be effective in the case of two nuclear powers confronting one another. But even here there are problems. By their nature crises tend to distort and limit rational thinking. I would feel much greater confidence in the strength of theories of rational choice if they could be shown to work on people who are under great stress. Conclusions drawn from the “prisoner's dilemma,” for example, would be more persuasive if the example were not of two people making decisions each in his quiet cell, but of two people who were simultaneously being tortured. Security studies often assume a calmness and an unemotional setting that real crisis decision-making does not exhibit. But the most serious objection to the effectiveness of the rationality argument is the larger argument that there is a destructive urge in human nature that matches and sometimes overwhelms the reasoning part of our brains. I would hesitate to put such an argument, given its speculative nature, were I not in the company of men whose judgment I trust. Here is Robert Kennedy in To Seek A Newer World, the book of policy positions published for his 1968 run for the presidency: Those who disparage the threat of nuclear weapons ignore all evidence of the darker side of man, and of the history of the West – our history. Many times the nations of the West have plunged into inexplicable cataclysm, mutual slaughter so terrible and so widespread that it amounted nearly to the suicide of a civilization. The religious wars of the sixteenth century, the Thirty Years' war in the seventeenth century, the terrible excesses that followed the French Revolution these have been equaled and grotesquely outmatched in the modern twentieth century. Twice within the memory of living men, the nations of Europe, the most advanced and cultured societies of the world, have torn themselves and each other apart for causes so slight, in relation to the cost of struggle, that it is impossible to regard them as other than excuses for the expression of some darker impulse. Barbara Tuchman reminds us that the people of Europe were relieved at the outbreak of World War I: “Better a horrible ending than a horror without end,” said people in Germany. “Is not peace an element of civil corruption,” asked the great writer Thomas Mann, and war “a purification, a liberation, an enormous hope?” Englishmen cheered the news of war's outbreak all day and night, and Rupert Brook wrote: Now God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour Honour has come back And we have come into our heritage Perhaps only in Germany was similar enthusiasm to greet renewed combat in 1939. But the damage of the second war was greater, especially to noncombatants. The camps and ovens, the murders and mutual inhumanities of the Eastern front, the unrestricted bombing of cities (with deliberate concentration on areas of workers' housing), the first use of atomic bombs – truly this was war virtually without rules or limits. Its most important lesson for us is perhaps that we have no real explanation for it. We can explain how war broke out. We can understand our own response to the Nazi threat. But we have no reason for the fantastic disproportion between the combatants' war aims and the things that were done, none perhaps but the wrath of war described by Achilles in Book XVIII of the Iliad, that makes a man go mad for all his goodness of reason, That rage that rises within and swirls like smoke in the heart and becomes in our madness a thing more sweet than the dripping of honey. The destruction of the two World Wars was limited only by technology. Now nuclear weapons have removed that limit. Who can say that they will not be used, that a rational balance of terror will restrain emotions we do not understand? Of course, we have survived into the third decade of the Atomic Age. Despite many limited wars and crises before 1914, Europe had known substantial peace for a century – and at its end saw war as deliverance. Nuclear war may never come, but it would be the rashest folly and ignorance to think that it will not come because men, being reasonable beings, will realize the destruction it would cause. This argument is made stronger by the startling story told by Robert McNamara in the recent movie “The Fog of War.” McNamara met Fidel Castro at a conference for participants in the Cuban Missile crisis. They had gathered to review and reflect on the world's most dangerous crisis. Castro told McNamara that during the crisis there had been more than 150 usable nuclear warheads in Cuba and that at the height of the crisis he (Castro) had recommended to Khrushchev that those weapons be used to attack the US. “Didn't you know that that would lead to the total destruction of Cuba?” McNamara asked. “Oh, yes,” Fidel replied. Sometimes it seems, even when the danger is readily apparent, decision-makers make choices based on criteria other than rational analysis designed to maximize rewards.

#### Reducing US naval presence allows for regional naval alliances – the US will draw out of Asia uniquely

Kaplan, 10

(Robert, national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “The Geog­ra­phy of Chi­nese Power,” Foreign Affairs, NJ)

A Greater China may be emerging politically, economically, or militarily in Central Asia, on the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia, and in the western Pacific. But just beyond this new realm will be a stream of U.S. warships, many perhaps headquartered in Oceania and partnering with naval forces from India, Japan, and other democracies. And in time, as China's confidence grows, its blue-water force could develop a less territorial approach and itself be drawn into a large regional naval alliance. / In the meantime, it is worth noting that, as the political scientist Robert Ross pointed out in 1999, in military terms, the relationship between the United States and China will be more stable than was the one between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is because of the particular geography of East Asia. During the Cold War, U.S. maritime power alone was insufficient to contain the Soviet Union; a significant land force in Europe was also required. But no such land force will ever be required around the edge of Eurasia, because even as the United States' land presence around the borders of a Greater China diminishes, the U.S. Navy will continue to be stronger than the Chinese Navy. / Still, the very fact of China's rising economic and military power will exacerbate U.S.-Chinese tensions in the years ahead. To paraphrase Mearsheimer, the United States, the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere. This could be the signal drama of the age.

## Brazil DA

### AT: No China Impact

#### And, other advantages means they’ll have the upper hand

Kaplan, 5

(Robert D, Senior Fellow at the Center for New American Security, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-would-fight-china/3959/>, NJ)

In any naval encounter China will have distinct advantages over the United States, even if it lags in technological military prowess. It has the benefit, for one thing, of sheer proximity. Its military is an avid student of the competition, and a fast learner. It has growing increments of "soft" power that demonstrate a particular gift for adaptation. While stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones. All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the-way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence—by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsing with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium.

#### And, CCP lashes out if they think they’re losing war – leads to bioweapon use

Renxing, 5

(San, staff writer, “The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War,” Epoch Times, p. http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30931.html, NJ)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches.

#### Bioweapon use causes extinction

Ochs, 2

(Richard, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately”, June 09, Online: http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html, NJ)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? Human extinction is now possible.